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of occupations is indicative of the tendency of the courts to confine the
application of licensing and regulatory statutes in derogation of a common right strictly to the specific instances enumerated in the statute.' 5
The Legislature of Wisconsin is blessed with a foresight most unusual in state legislatures, having avoided this question entirely. Not
only has it passed a statute requiring barbers to be licensed,' 6 but it has
This statute contains
included a chapter regulating beauty parlors.'
this definition: "Barbering is shaving, trimming the beard, cutting the
hair, shampooing, scalp or face massage of a male over ten years of age
for payment."' 8 It is specific and leaves no need for interpretation.
The chapter regulating beauty parlors provides that "no person shall
follow the occupation of beauty parlor manager, operator or apprentice
without a license."' 19 It is significant that although the statute has taken
great pains to define the occupation of barbering most exactly, yet upon
the definition of a beauty parlor it is ominously silent. Apparently the
courts are not alone in their trepidity of encroaching upon the exclusive
domain of the "deadly sex," for the Wisconsin Legislature, though
bolder, appears equally ignorant of the artificial aids to pulchritude employed by the "female of the species."
WILL C. GOBEL.
Master and Servant: Employee of National Guard is entitled to
compensation under Employers' Liability Law.-Can a national
guardsman recover a compensation award under the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries suffered while serving in his capacity as a
guardsman or in doing any work connected therewith? This question
has been aswered in the affirmative by the recent case of Nebraska
National Guard v. Morgan, (Neb. 1924) i9

N. W. 557.

One Morgan

was employed as a carpenter to erect shed kitchens for each of the companies of the Nebraska National Guard which were to gather for an
encampment near the city of Ashland in August, 1923. Plaintiff was
employed on July 23 and worked for six consecutive days until he met
' The italics are writer's.
"A corporation engaged in producing, buying and selling oil, and oil products,
owning and using tank cars solely for transporting its own products, which owner-

ship is necessitated by the failure of railroads to provide cars, is not engaged in
the business of owning tank cars within the Laws of Florida 1913, sec. 642I ...
and by sec. 46 imposing such tax on 'any corporation owning, controlling or
operating tank cars.'" Texas Co. v. Amos, 81 So. 471, 77 Fla. 327; Matthews v.
State, 214 S. W. 339, 85 Tex. Cr. App. 469. "Under Motor Vehicle Law, par. 289,
defendant telephone repairer, while using automobile furnished him by employer
to convey himself and necessary materials from place to place, held not a chauffeur." People v. Dennis, i66 N. Y. Supp. 318.
"The mere giving of massage treatments professionally falls within the profession of a trained nurse and one who gives such treatments is not required to be
licensed." People v. Hettinger, i5o Ill. App. 448.
' Chap. I58, Wis. Ann. Stats. 1923.
" Chap. i59, Wis. Ann. Stats. 1923.
" Sec. 158.Ol, Wis. Stats.

" Sec. 159.02, Wis. Stats.

NOTES AND COMMENT

with the accident which resulted in the injuries for which he claimed
compensation. It was contended by the state which appealed from the
award made to plaintiff, that Morgan was not an employee of the state
of Nebraska; and the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in affirming the
award made by the labor commissioner and by the district court, held
"that the Nebraska National Guard is a governmental agency of the
state within the Employers' Liability Law, and an employee thereof is
entitled to compensation for injuries received in consequence of an
accident arising out of and in the course of such employment."'
It is surprising to note that a question of this nature has never been
brought before our Wisconsin Supreme Court, but we are assured of a
decision on this question in the near future, for an appeal is to be taken
from a ruling by Judge E. Ray Stevens of the Circuit Court of Dane
County, in a similar case under our Workmen's Compensation Act. In
this pending case it was the contention of the state that the Wisconsin
National Guard is a part of the federal army. In overruling this contention, Judge Stevens says: "Plaintiff was in the state militia camp
under order of the governor, and in charge of officers appointed by the
state. In the absence of other controlling facts, it follows that he was
of the state during the period of his training at Camp
an employee
'2
Douglas."

In view of the fact that our Supreme Court will have to pass upon
the status of the Wisconsin National Guard under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, in deciding this case on appeal, it is interesting to
see if there are any cases in this state or any similarity between our
Compensation Act, and that adopted in Nebraska, which would warrant
a ruling favorable to guardsmen who may be placed in a like situation
as that of Clifford Johnson.
In Nebraska, an employee is defined as, "Every person in the service
apof the state or any governmental agency created by it, under any
3
pointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.
The Wisconsin Act includes in its definition of an employee the
clause, "Every person in the service of the state, or of any county, city,
town, village, or school district therein under any appointment, or
contract of hire, express or implied, oral oi written, except any official
or of any county, city, town, village, or school district
of the state,
4'
therein.

The only material difference between these two definitions is, that the
Nebraska definition contains the phrase "governmental agency," while
the Wisconsin Act includes all employees of the state and of its political
subdivisions.5 It can readily be seen that this phrase "political subdivisions" is analogous to the phrase "governmental agency" as used in
the Nebraska Compensation Act.
The question therefore is, "Is the National Guard a state or federal
'Nebraska National Guard v. Morgan, decided in July, I924. Reported in
igg N. W. 557.
' Judge Stevens in the Clifford Johnson Case.
Comp. Stat. 1922, 3038 Subdivision i.
'Comp. Stat. 1923, Sec. 102.E to 1o2.34.
Note I5 on Page 6 of Report of Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 1921.
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institution? If it is a state institution then any member thereof can
claim awards under our Compensation Act for injuries received while
exercising duties within the scope of his employment. If, on the other
hand, it is the federal Government which has exclusive control over the
state militia, it follows that the members therof are federal employees
and can not claim under the state Compensation Act, for they are not
employees of the state nor of any political subdivisions thereof.
It is provided in the constitution of the United States that Congress
shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in
the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline provided by Congress. 6
It is also stated that Congress is to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions.'
It -would seem that the framers of our fundamental law intended that
Congress is to have exclusive control over the militia of each state, but
it has been held that these provisions do not give to Congress powers
over the militia beyond the specific objects enumerated. After a detachment of the militia has been called forth, and has entered into the
services of the United States, the authority of the general Government
over such detachment is exclusive."
The National Guard or State Militia is a body of state troops and,
until "called forth" by the President, it is under the control of the state.
The President may call forth such "troops" for specific purposes and
when so called forth and assembled they come under the control of and
into the service of the United States."
It has been further held that the time when an enlisted man ceases
to be a state militia man and becomes a national militia man of the
federal Government, is when he is mustered into the service of the
United States and refusal to be mustered into the federal service is the
act of a state militia man."0 In this case Justice Washington in speaking for the court said, "So long as the militia are acting under the
military jurisdiction of the state to which they belong, the powers of
legislation over them are concurrent in the general and state government.
It is sometimes said that as the state National Guard receives aid
toward defraying expenses, in the way of funds from the federal
treasurer, such National Guard surely was intended for federal control
and the members thereof are employees of the national Government.
But this seems to have been settled in an early case in which it was ruled
"That the mere fact that the State Militia has been so organized as to
entitle it to receive federal aid does not prevent its maintenance from
being a necessity of state government."'
'Subsection i6 of Sec. 8 of U. S. Constitution.
'Subsection 15 of Sec. 8 of the U. S. Constitution.
'Duffied v. Smith, 6 Binney 306; Houston v. Moore, 5 U. S. 19; Dunne v.
People, 94 Ill. 120.
'Ala. Great Southern Ry. v. U. S. I914 Ct. Cl. 522.
" Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton i.
"State v. Moore, 88 S. W. 881.
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The cases throughout the United States tend to hold that the militia
was intended for use by the state. It is to be the "police force of the
state." As expressed in Ruling Case Law "It may be laid down as a
generally accepted rule that the organized militia of the states is a state
institutin-a governmental agency. It is part of the executive branch
of the state government to be used as a last resort to compel obedience
to the laws." It is a domestic force as distinguished from regular
"troops" and is only liable to be
called into service when the exigencies
12
of the state make it necessary.
In the face of these decisions it can be seen that it is the state which is
to assume control over its National Guard, once it is organized. The
rule can be made applicable to Wisconsin as it has been made in other
states. Our statutes provide for the organizing of a National Guard
and the Governor is made the commander-in-chief of such organization.
Our state makes appropriations toward the maintenance of this institution when formed. The company is to constitute a corporate body when
formed. 13
It has always been and rightfully should be the policy of the state to
encourage enlistment in these forces which are so necessary for state
aid in case of emergencies, but is a refusal to duly compensate an injured guardsman in harmony with such policy? Will not such an attitude toward those who may have cause to claim compensation rather
result in a discouragement of enlistm~ent on the part of public spirited
citizens ?
Other states have appreciated the sacrifice made on the part of its
citizens who answered the call to the defense of the state. They have
made appropriations in every form to provide for its militia man. Such
laws, which resulted in a tax assessment upon the public at large, were
declared constitutional as being for a public use. It was settled that the
Legislature has the power to provide for compensation to members of
the National Guard who may be injured while performing any duty,
lawfully ordered by their superior officer. A provision of this nature
by general statute was held to create a moral obligation by a state to a
soldier who enlists, and who is afterwards injured while
performing a
4
lawfully ordered duty, without any fault of his own.1
A War Department Decision in 19o 4 held that "As the militia forces
while participating in joint maneuvers are not "called forth" in the
manner or for any of the purposes prescribed in the constitution, they
continue to be state forces, and do not at any time pass into the service
of the United States, and claims for damages on account of injuries
sustained during the participation in such maneuvers can not be adjusted by the War Department and should be presented to the state in
whose service the parties were when the injuries were received.So we can infer from this decision by the War Department that the
injured militia man must look to his relief from the state, which it de"Vol. i8 R. C. L. Paragraph 51; Chic. v. Chic. League Ball Club, 196 Ill. 54;

Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120.
" Sections 20.01, 21.OI, 21.02, 21.33, 21.36, 21.42 Wis. Statutes,

1923.

"Woodall v. Darst, 77 S. E. 264.
"War Department Decisions, Feb. 15, 1904: 27 Cyc. 5o4, Section 93.
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dares to be the employer in this case. It is unjust to create a situation
in which an injured militia man should have to seek his remedy under
the Federal Act only to be met by a decision such as rendered by the
War Department as mentioned above. In the light of these cases, few
in number, but which illustrate the trend of the opinions on this subject, it is evident that the state should assume its responsibility as an
employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act as it has done in its
other institutions.
HARRY S. SICULA.

Municipal Corporations: Rights of abutting owner.-There are
several rights which the courts recognize as inherent in property
abutting on a street.' The right to egress and ingress 2 to light and air,3
to public view,4 to have the street continued as a public highway, unless
it becomes useless, inconvenient and burdensome, 5 and whatever adds
to the value of the street to the abutter are examples.
Can a hotel restrain taxicabs from parking in front of its place of
business? This question has arisen and been disposed of in the recent
Wisconsin case of the Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum et al (Wis. 1924) 199
N. W. 219.8 The Park Hotel of Madison as lessee brought an action to
enjoin defendant and others from parking their taxicabs upon the street
abutting plaintiff's property while waiting for passengers. The superior court issued an order restraining the defendants from driving
their cabs up to the curb upon the street abutting upon the premises so
occupied by the plaintiff, and stopping their cabs for a longer period
than was reasonably necessary to discharge or take on passengers. The
Supreme Court held that parking for the purpose of waiting for or
discharging passengers was a legitimate use of the streets which did
not conflict with the rights of an abutter.
Where the use of the streets is not a legitimate use the courts have
enjoined it at suit of an abutter who claims his rights are being violated.
The Missouri Court has decided that a city ordinance which licensed and
gave to produce stands spaces on the street, was invalid as conflicting
with the rights of an abutter.7 They are a nuisance when built upon
the streets, although sufficient space be left open for passage of vehicles
and pedestrians."
An early New Jersey decision holds that the Legislature was without
power to authorize a market to be held upon the street without compensating the abutter owners.' Upon a cursory glance of the authorities,
it is apparent that the courts have. gone as far as possible to protect the
rights of abutters.
'McQuillin on Municipal corporations, 1322.
'Davis v.

City of Appleton, 109 Wis. 58o-85 N. W. 515.

'Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. 104 N. Y. 268.
'Branaham v. Hotel Co. 33 Ohio St. 333, 48 Am. Rep. 457.
'Conmonwealth v. Roxbury, 8 Mass. 457.
6Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, i99 N. W. 219.
'Schropp et al v. City of St. Louis, r17 Mo. 131, 22 S. W. 828.

'Dillon, Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.) 383.
'State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. law, 202.

